Abductive inference, as defined by Charles S. Peirce, involves (1) observation of a surprising fact, (2) formulating (guessing) a proposition which, if true, would explain this fact as a matter of course, (3) and provisional acceptance of the proposition as true, (4) leading to its being taken as a premise for subsequent deduction, the consequences of which will then be related to further observations via induction--surprises from which can then trigger new abductive inferences, and so forth. Peirce limited this process to human reasoning because he viewed thought as a semiosis (flow of signs) continuous between the human mind and the world, such that (1) the human subject is in thought, as opposed to thought being in the subject, and that (2) there is an intrinsic ability of human beings to "guess right" as a consequence of this continuity of mind and world. The challenge posed by this view of thinking is that, unlike a human subject, any vehicle for autonomous reasoning is a newly created object that is separate from the world. It cannot be what Martin Heidegger termed a "being-in-the-world" because of the artificial separation of its thought from the world viewed as semiosis.
INTRODUCTION
There is a curious dichotomy in the science of artificial intelligence, at least from the viewpoint of this outside observer. On the one hand there is a kind of optimism for eventually achieving an "artificial general intelligence" (AGI), such that machines will eventually be created (or will evolve) to equal (or even exceed) all mental tasks that are associated with human beings. On the other hand, there is also a long-standing pessimism that this will never be achieved.
There are interesting corollaries to this dichotomy. Should AGI prevail humankind could be at risk of being replaced by, or at least subjugated to, the superior intellects associated with the bearers of AGI. This view came to much public attention on December 2, 2014, when, in an interview to the British Broadcasting Corporation, theoretical physicistBecause the quest for achieving such non-deterministic autonomy may involve aspects of human reasoning that have not historically been central concerns for the science of artificial intelligence, this paper will take the form of a historical essay, introducing topics that have often been misunderstood because of ingrained assumptions about the nature of logic, thinking, reasoning, science, etc.
Reasoning has generally been associated with the thinking processes that human beings employ in a logical or sensible way to reach conclusions, judgments, or inferences. Logic can be viewed as a normative science focused on ideal reasoning such that it will be correct or reliable. The goal of being correct will result in focusing logic on deductive reasoning, which is the mode that dominates in mathematics. Given the broader goal of reliability in the long run, logic can be expanded to consider reasoning that is either (a) analytic, in which case the reasoning leads to valid outcomes through meanings that are internal to the reasoning process itself, or (b) synthetic, in which case the reasoning process includes meanings that are external to the reasoning process. Modern formal logic focuses on deduction as the mode of analysis and induction as the mode of synthesis. While deduction and induction can readily be replicated by artificial means, a second form of synthetic inference, abduction, may be more problematic, depending upon how this form of reasoning is to be understood. Abduction will be a central concern of this essay.
FIFTY YEARS AGO -OPTIMISM AND SOME DOUBTS
It is commonly held that artificial intelligence (AI) began in 1956 with the work of scientists like Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, Arthur Samuel and Herbert Simon. During the 1960s well-funded AI programs were established around the world, and there was tremendous optimism for its future prospects.
During this period there was a philosopher teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which had one of the highest profile AI research programs. In teaching classes about how philosophy had traditionally dealt with issues of human perception, understanding and meaning, this philosopher was shocked to find many of his students responding that these ideas had been superseded because machines were being developed that could perform all these presumed human activities. Moreover, the machines clearly would be able to do them much better.
Had this philosopher, Hubert Dreyfus, been of the mainstream, analytical variety, common in the U.S and Britain, he might well have embraced the views of his students. Analytical philosophy involves uses of formal logic and conceptual analysis, usually on the model of science, especially physics and mathematics, to bring clarity and precision to concepts, thought, and language. This is the kind of philosophy that underpins the various assumptions about knowledge and reality that are made most commonly in AI research.
The philosophical interests of Hubert Dreyfus lay with continental philosophers, who focused their attention on the human subject. As he later reflected on this period, Dreyfus wrote [1] : "As I taught I wondered more and more how computers, which have no bodies, no childhood, and no cultural practices but are disembodied, fully formed, nonsocial, purely analytic engines, could be intelligent at all." Hubert Dreyfus was particularly interested in the view about the nature of human beings that had been expressed decades earlier by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who is widely regarded as the most important of all continental philosophers, and whose views will be discussed in the next section.
ONE HUNDRED YEAS AGO -EINSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER
In a 1918 Berlin address, published in 1934 and reprinted in Ideas and Opinions, Albert Einstein [2] places limits on the cosmos, i.e., the world, as it is envisioned through the methods of theoretical physics: "The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them."
In a 1919 lecture, reprinted in his Collected Papers, Einstein [3] further elaborates that the "intuitive grasp of the essentials of a large complex of facts leads the scientist" to "a basic law," then "from the basic law (system of axioms) he derives his conclusion as completely as possible in a purely logically deductive manner" [3] . The conclusions deduced from the basic law are then "compared to experience and in this manner provide criteria for the justification of the assumed basic law. Basic law (axioms) and conclusion together form what is called a 'theory.'" So, "while the researcher always starts out from facts, whose mutual connections are his aim," he "adapts to the facts by intuitive selection among the conceivable theories that are based upon axioms" [4] .
These passages might be inferred to imply that the scientific method consists of the movement of inferences from "a large complex of facts," which is a process of synthesis, to a basic law from which those facts can be deduced, which is a process of analysis. The process is then completed when comparison is made to experience to "provide criteria for the justification of the assumed basic law." The analytical part of this process clearly involves the logic of deduction, and it has been widely presumed that the synthetic part is limited to the logic of induction. But Einstein also speaks of "intuition," the "intuitive grasp of essentials," and the "sympathetic understanding of experience." Where do such feelings fit into the method of science? For the analytical philosophy that became the dominant philosophy of science of the 20 th century, intuitions and related creative insights are not parts of the inferential, logical apparatus that makes for science. Instead, they are matters of individual psychology relating to the feelings of unique individuals, and thus not properly subject to logical analysis.
At the same time that Einstein was writing the above, Martin Heidegger was engaging with the issue of phenomenology, a field of inquiry developed by his mentor Edmund Husserl. Phenomenology, according to Husserl deals with that which appears to the human subject, i.e., how the gap is closed between objects in the world and the human mind. This is a classical problem for epistemology, which is the part of philosophy that deals with nature of knowledge about the world. However, Heidegger came to the realization that the problem was much more basic than that of epistemology. It was a matter of ontology, which has to do with the nature of the world itself, encompassing both subject (human being) and object (the world).
This insight led Heidegger, in his great philosophical work Being and Time [5] , originally published in 1927, to conclude that human beings do not achieve meaning merely through the conceptual imprint on their minds that is made by external objects in the world. That notion implies a kind of separation between the world and the knowing subject (the human being). The human being is actually "in the world" having been born (thrown) into it, thereby emerging from it. The world is disclosed to this human subject by its being part of the world, while the world is also part of it.
As a practical matter Heidegger's view of a human "being-in-the world" means that the world is disclosed to the human subject by practical interactions that occur in daily life. But it is also more than that. The human being is actually a kind of focus through which the world discloses itself. Instead of making detached interpretations of the world around it, the human being is a self-interpreting animal whose very nature is to develop meanings for the complex world from which it has itself emerged at birth.
Understanding for human beings is not so much that which gets achieved by conscious interpretive effort, but that which can be achieved through everyday actions, so that to interpret is simply to be human. The "world" for this human "being-in-the-world" is not just a bunch of separate objects at which the human merely looks, or even like a laboratory in which the human's theories get tested. The "world" into which humans find themselves thrown is more like a home or an environment with which they have a kind of natural familiarity.
Humans understand the content of the world not simply as objects to be examined at some instant in time, but rather as familiar entities encountered on the basis of a mood or attitude derived from past experience with a view toward some future purpose. For humans the interpretive understanding of the world operates in this kind of continuing temporal context that is always directed at future possibilities. This all can be envisioned through the notion of the hermeneutic (interpretive) circle. This way of thinking holds that the entities of the world can only be understood to have meaning in a larger context, in analogous manner to how words in a literary text only have meaning in terms of the sentences that contain hem, with sentences having meaning in terms of paragraphs, paragraphs in terms of chapters, chapters in terms of the whole book, etc. Understanding involves a continual interpretive interplay between part and whole context for that part, then back to part, then back to whole context, etc., with each cycle increasing the level of understanding.
150 YEARS AGO -CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE
In 1868-1869 the great American logician and philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, had 3 papers published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. These papers dealt with issues of logic, reality, and cognition that continued to be the focus of Peirce's subsequent philosophical career for which he has only recently become recognized [6] . The first of these papers, Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man [7] deals with the problem of having immediate and direct knowledge of the world. The paper is Peirce's attempt to develop some consequences of his discovery of a post-Kantian set of universal conceptions, or "categories," that he viewed as required for the unification of all experience of the world [8] . Peirce's categories are three: Firstness--feeling, chance, and being; Secondness-constraints of the world, including matter, energy, and relatedness; and Thirdness-intelligibility of the world, including, laws, the tendency to take habits, mediation, and evolution.
Continuing with his discussion of human faculties, Peirce [7] concluded that all knowledge is mediated through an inferential process involving signs. His definition of what is meant by a sign is distinctive and develops further through his career, but the key insight is that all thought is in signs. This point can be grasped from one of Peirce's later definitions of "sign" [9] , as follows: "… anything which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in some way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum."
The ad infinitum is very important because the interpretant component to the sign means that all signs (and therefore all thoughts) cannot occur in isolation, but only in direct relationship to subsequent signs (or thoughts). As Peirce states this [7] : "No present actual thought (which is [in itself] a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual value; for this [meaning] lies not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts, so that the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual."
That isolated thoughts do not exist, however, does not mean that all thought is non-existent. Thought is in motion, and thereby exists in a continuum. Neither cognition nor representation exists at one instantaneous state of mind, but rather they exist in a continuity of mind, or as Peirce [7] puts it: "Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us."
In his second Journal of Speculative Philosophy paper, Some Consequnces Four Incompacities, Peirce [10] provides an account of mind and reality. If every thought is a sign, and man is within thought, then man, as a thinking thing, must also be a sign. Moreover, in order for reliable human cognition to occur within this world of signs of which humans are a part, then mental events must involve some pattern of inferences. Inferences, or more broadly reasoning, include the familiar forms of logical inference: deductive and inductive. But to these Peirce concludes that he must add as a third, which he initially termed "hypothetic."
In later work Peirce recognized that the mode of inference he initially labeled "hypothetic" was essentially the same as a syllogistic formulation that Aristotle had much earlier labeled "abduction." Peirce subsequently adopted Aristotle's terminology, though he also sometimes refers to "retroduction," perhaps to emphasize the distinction from deduction.
As Peirce ultimately defined it, abductive reasoning begins, first, when a surprising fact is observed. This fact is a kind of anomaly in that it seems inconsistent with what would be expected given the current state of understanding. To resolve this anomaly the reasoner then proceeds to formulate (guess) a proposition such that, if this proposition were true, then the otherwise surprising fact would be explicable as a matter of course. Finally, abduction involves the provisional acceptance of the proposition (guess) as true. This final abductive step then leads to the proposition (guess) being taken as a premise for a subsequent deduction, the consequences of which will then be related to further observations via induction. Any surprises uncovered in this inductive stage may then trigger a new abductive inference, and so forth.
The full reasoning process, which Peirce also considered to be the method of science, proceeds in a circle. Abductions result in hypotheses from which consequences are deduced that get matched against observations through induction. This is a testing process that includes correspondence, consistency and coherence in the light of all relevant observations. Any discoveries of observational patterns get scrutinized for surprising facts (anomalies) that can then lead to new abductions, and so forth. These subsequent abductions provide a new component to the circle so that the overall pattern of progressing inferences becomes that of a spiral.
Note that this general pattern of inferential thought and science is broadly similar to that of the interpretive, hermeneutic circle envisioned by Martin Heidegger. So, just as Peirce recognized interpretants to be intrinsic to signs, and all thought to be a flow of signs, i.e., a semiosis, with humans also being signs, then human beings must also be, as later recognized by Heidegger, self-interpreting animals.
DISCUSSION
There is on the Theodore von Kármán Auditorium of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory this quotation from the famous aeronautical engineer for whom the building is named: "Scientists study the world as it is, engineers create the world that never has been." Given that machines are created for "a world that never has been" the problem posed by Heidegger [5] for AGI, as recognized 50 years ago by Hubert Dreyfus, is the impossibility of creating a machine that can acquire the human status of "being-in-the-world." If the latter is necessary for achieving a level of AGI that could lead to a Hawking-Musk Nightmare" then we all can sleep easy.
What of Peirce's view on this? As far back as his papers of 1868-69, Peirce developed an understanding of thought based on these elements:
1. Thought operates within the three universal categories that give meaning to all experience: Firstness, or feeling for the world, or being; Secondness, or the brute actuality of the world of matter and energy; and Thirdness, the intelligibility of the world, involving evolution and mediation.
2. Thought consists of signs, which have 3 components: sign, object, and interpretant.
3. Thought, being signs, exists in a continuum; it does not have parts or "bits" so there are no isolated thoughts.
4. There are three logical modes of inference that underlie all thought: abduction, deduction, and induction.
Peirce's idea of continuity is central to his whole philosophy [11] . Because he viewed thought as continuous with action, Peirce concluded that meaning lies in consequences that develop in the actual practices that follow for putting concepts into action. This is the basis for what has come to known as the philosophy of pragmatism, something that Peirce first expressed in his 1878 paper How to Make Our Ideas Clear [12] , as follows: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."
Peirce later claimed in his unpublished Lectures on Pragmatism that "If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction;" and further "no effect of pragmatism which is consequent upon its effect on abduction can go to show that pragmatism is anything more than a doctrine concerning the logic of abduction."
Because thought is continuous, and because Peirce considered logic to be what is ideal in regard to thought, he had to reject the forms of logic that reduced thought to isolated "bits." For this reason he developed a diagrammatic notation for logical expressions that he termed "existential graphs." This form of visualizing logic has been termed the "moving pictures of thought" [13] . Recognizing its importance for computation, the AI pioneer John Sowa at IBM used Peirce's ideas to develop what he termed "conceptual graphs" [14] . Sowa subsequently [15] extended this work to embrace all of Peirce's pragmatism.
In the last paragraph of his interesting paper, A Theory of Probable Inference [16] , Piece claims, "Side by side, then, with the well established proposition that all knowledge is based on experience, and that science is only advanced by the experimental verifications of theories, we have to place this other equally important truth, that all human knowledge, up to the highest flights of science, is but the development of our inborn animal instincts." Peirce is here claiming that abduction, which is a kind of guessing, is warranted by the kind of instinct that was invoked as "intuition" a century ago by Albert Einstein. Though abduction, unlike deduction, cannot convey truth, its merit in reasoning is to provide humans with what Nathan Houser [17] , following Peirce, has termed "a scent for truth." From the writings of Galileo, Peirce also recognized that abduction derives its rationale by providing a "natural bent" to be in accordance with nature, or what Galileo termed il lume naturale (the light of nature) [18] . Abduction conveys a kind of fruitfulness for inquiry, which Peirce termed "uberty" [19] leading to the human being's instinctive inclination to "guess right," something that would only seem possible for a "being-in-the world."
CONCLUSIONS
As defined by the logician Charles Sanders Peirce, abductive reasoning begins, first, when a surprising fact is observed. It then proceeds, second, to formulating (guessing) a proposition such that, if this proposition were true, then the otherwise surprising fact would be explicable as a matter of course. Finally, abduction involves the provisional acceptance of the proposition (guess) as true. This final abductive step then leads to the proposition (guess) being taken as a premise for subsequent deduction, the consequences of which will then be related to further observations via induction. Any surprises uncovered in that stage can then trigger a new abductive inference, and so forth.
The challenge for achieving fully autonomous reasoning is whether the human-centered, subjective/emotional elements of surprise and guessing can be replicated independently of a human component. Peirce limited the abductive process to human reasoning because he viewed thought as a semiosis (flow of signs) continuous between the human mind and the world, such that (1) the human subject is in thought, as opposed to thought being limited to what is in the subject, and that (2) there is an intrinsic ability of human beings to "guess right" as a consequence of this continuity of mind and world. The challenge posed by this view of thinking is that, unlike a human subject, any vehicle for autonomous reasoning would be a created artificial object that is separate from the world. It could not be what Martin Heidegger termed a "being-in-the-world" because of the artificial separation of its thought processes from the world viewed as semiosis. Nevertheless, it is possible that an artificial system might be able to implement many elements of the abductive sequence, minus the total continuity of thought with the world.
Thought, then, is not something that humans merely do because of what is in their minds. To be human is to be in thought. Imparting thought into machines would make them alien not just to humans, but also to the entire world of thought to which human beings are party. The machines could be rivals, of course, but they would be rivals not just to individual humans, but also to the entire world of thought that is intrinsic to what it is to be a human being. This would be a severe limitation. In contrast, however, if machines can be brought into the world of thought in the company of human beings, then, even though they could never be truly human in Heidegger's sense of "being-in-the-world," nevertheless, as co-members of the world of thought, which for Peirce constitutes nearly all the real world, then machines might be able advance in thought as colleagues and collaborators of the human beings. This could make for a very pleasant dream indeed.
